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Pavlov’s contribution to experimental psychology was to invent a technique that allowed
him to undertake a prolonged and systematic series of well-controlled experiments that,
astonishingly enough, uncovered many if not most of the phenomena of what is rightly
called Pavlovian conditioning. It was not for another 30 years or more that English-
speaking psychologists began to match that achievement. Of course there have been new
developments and discoveries since his time. Two examples are discussed: the important
role of variable associability or attention even in simple conditioning, and the rigorous
application of associative learning theory to the behavior of adult humans.
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La contribución de Pavlov a la psicología experimental fue inventar una técnica que le
permitió acometer una serie prolongada y sistemática de experimentos bien controlados
que desvelaron muchos, si no la mayoría, de los fenómenos de lo que justamente se
llama condicionamiento pavloviano. Los psicólogos angloparlantes tardarían 30 años o
más en igualar ese logro. Por supuesto, se han dado nuevos desarrollos y descubrimientos
desde su época. Se comentan dos ejemplos: el importante papel de la asociabilidad
variable o la atención incluso en el condicionamiento simple y la aplicación rigurosa de
la teoría del aprendizaje asociativo a la conducta de los seres humanos adultos.
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Pavlov’s Contribution
The history of associationism, as of all good, and some not
so good, ideas, can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy.
But it was Pavlov’s discovery of the conditioned reflex that
made the scientific study of associationism or associative
learning possible. Pavlov’s work has not been without its critics:
George Bernard Shaw (1944, p. 208) famously asserted that
“the story of his dogs in his book is a crackle of blazing
nonsense from beginning to end.” But this was after H.G. Wells
had announced that if he saw Pavlov and Shaw drowning, and
had only one lifebuoy available, he would throw it to Pavlov
and leave Shaw to drown. Others have shown that it is possible
to find earlier descriptions of people or other animals behaving
in ways that we would now describe in the terminology that
Pavlov invented. A nice example is provided by Rosenzweig
(1962), who cites Robert Whytt’s An Essay on the Vital and
Other Involuntary Motions of Animals, published in 1763: “The
remembrance or idea of substances formerly applied …
produces almost the same effect as if these substances were
really present. Thus the sight, or even the recalled idea of
grateful food, causes an uncommon flow of spittle into the
mouth of a hungry person; and the seeing of a lemon can
produce the same effect in many people.”
But it was still Pavlov who discovered conditioned
reflexes, in the sense that it was the procedures and techniques
of his experiments that identified the conditioned reflex as a
phenomenon worth studying, showed how it could be studied,
and made the serious and scientific investigation of associative
learning possible. We are all in his debt.
Pavlov invented a technique for the study of conditioning,
and used that technique in a prolonged and systematic series
of well-controlled experiments. One hundred years later, it is
easy for us to criticize many of his experiments, and to point
out that they rarely meet the standards of control and rigor
that the editor of the Journal of Experimental Psychology
requires today. A hundred years ago, however, his experimental
program represented an astonishing achievement, and one
that it took English-speaking psychologists at least 25 to 30
years to match. It is true that few if any people today are
studying salivary conditioning in dogs, but no one has studied
cats learning to escape from Thorndike’s puzzle box for more
than half a century. Indeed, we now know, thanks to the work
of Moore and Stuttard (1979), that Guthrie and Horton (1946),
the last people to do so, were merely eliciting, and then
carefully recording, their cats’ greeting gestures. Pavlov’s
experimental paradigm set the standard for what is required
for the experimental analysis of associative learning, and
virtually all the advances that have been made since 1965 in
our understanding of associative learning, even if they have
not relied on salivating dogs, have been based on procedures
closely modeled on those he developed.
That paradigm also allowed Pavlov himself to make a
remarkable number of discoveries about conditioning that
have stood the test of time—not a claim that anyone would
want to make about Thorndike’s puzzle box experiments. The
list includes: acquisition, extinction and spontaneous recovery;
forward and backward, delay and trace conditioning; higher-
order conditioning; generalization and discrimination; positive
and negative patterning (the A+, B+, AB– discrimination);
conditioned inhibition and the summation and retardation tests
needed to detect it; generalization of inhibition;
counterconditioning; reinstatement; external inhibition and
disinhibition; overshadowing as a function of relative salience
or relative validity; and transfer along a continuum. (It is
probably wise to pass over his experiments on positive and
negative induction: some find a parallel in more modern work
on contrast, but some of his results remain puzzling and not
well replicated).
Pavlov repeatedly and adamantly insisted that he was a
physiologist, not a psychologist, and much of his theorizing
was couched in quasi-physiological language. Most of it has,
deservedly, been rejected, and it was left to Konorski (1948)
to reinterpret Pavlov’s ideas in more acceptable physiological
terms. Konorski’s analysis is more acceptable, of course,
because, rather than appealing to spreading waves of
excitation and inhibition across the cortex, it talked of
excitatory and inhibitory connections. In other words, it was
an associative analysis—and Pavlov’s account of conditioning
was equally associationist.
Although he might not want to have admitted it, Pavlov
did indeed engage in psychological theorizing. He drew a
sharp distinction between excitatory and inhibitory
conditioning. He attributed excitatory conditioning to the
ability of a conditioned stimulus (CS) paired with an
unconditioned stimulus (US) to activate a representation of
(or the center for) that US, and thereby activate components
of the unconditioned response (UR) elicited by the US itself.
This stimulus-substitution theory, which can be contrasted
with an S-R theory of conditioning, may need substantial
qualification, but remains a viable and, at least in part, a
widely accepted, account of Pavlovian conditioning to this
day. He argued that extinction and inhibitory conditioning
do not simply represent the weakening of an excitatory
association, but rather the strengthening of a process of
inhibition, which opposes or counteracts the still existing
excitatory association. Again, this is unquestionably a
psychological theory—and again one that would be widely
accepted today. Only some rather tortuous argument, and
refusal to consider all Pavlov’s evidence, allowed Skinner
(1938) to dismiss the concept of inhibition.
Just as important, Pavlov was surely right to complain
about the way in which the conditioned reflex was used by
many American psychologists, when he wrote of Guthrie:
“The psychologist takes conditioning as the principle of
learning, and accepting this principle as not subject to further
analysis, not requiring ultimate investigation, he endeavors
to apply it to everything” (Pavlov, 1932, p. 91).
Ultimate investigation was what Pavlov aimed to achieve,
and what was surely needed.
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Developments since Pavlov
I have been talking of experiments undertaken, and
theories formulated, more than three quarters of a century
ago. One would hope that the study of conditioning and
associative learning had made some progress since then.
It is surely no discredit to Pavlov to say that it certainly
has. On the contrary, one of the best indicators of Pavlov’s
achievement as a scientific pioneer is that our
understanding of conditioning and associative learning
has gone well beyond his. It could not have done so
without his paradigm. I want to talk of two rather different
ways in which modern conditioning theory has progressed
since Pavlov’s time.
Variable Associability
Probably the most significant development in the theory
of conditioning in the past 30-40 years has been the
recognition of the importance of cue competition—the
observation that the strength of conditioning to a CS is a
function not only of its own relation to the US, but also of
the relation between the US and other CSs present at the
same time. The standard example of this is the blocking
effect reported by Kamin (1969): if animals receive
conditioning trials to a compound CS, AB, prior conditioning
to A alone reduces or blocks conditioning to B. But
overshadowing provides an equally important example: if
A is more salient than B, relatively little conditioning will
accrue to B on AB trials even if no prior conditioning was
given to A alone. As I have noted, of course, overshadowing
was first observed by Pavlov.
The most widely accepted account of blocking and
overshadowing is that provided by the error correction
model of Rescorla and Wagner (1972): the change in the
associative value of a CS on any trial is a function of the
discrepancy between the outcome of that trial and the
associative value of all stimuli present on that trial. But
other theories have suggested that cue competition is a
consequence of variations in the associability of, or attention
paid to, different components of a compound CS
(Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980). Pavlov’s own
explanation of overshadowing, as his choice of terminology
implies, seems to have been an attentional one—although
rather different from that suggested by Mackintosh or Pearce
and Hall. He reported (Pavlov, 1927, p. 141) that when a
compound of a thermal and a tactile stimulus served as the
CS for an acid US, the tactile stimulus alone elicited the
same strength CR as the compound, but the thermal
stimulus alone elicited no CR. “It is obvious, however,” he
continues, “that the ineffective component … could easily
be made to acquire powerful conditioned properties by
independent reinforcement outside the compound.” (Purists
may question whether this is an adequate experimental
design).
Pavlov states (1927) that the mechanism underlying this
overshadowing effect is “most probably a form of inhibition”
(p.144), but although he continues: “This matter will be
examined in detail in a subsequent lecture,” I cannot find
such an examination. So at this point I speculate. I assume
that what Pavlov meant here was a form of external
inhibition—where a strong stimulus presented alongside an
established CS elicits an orienting reflex or attentional
response, which thus distracts from the CS and prevents the
appearance of a normal CR. To explain overshadowing,
Pavlov must assume that the orienting reflex elicited by the
stronger component of a compound CS prevents the weaker
component from eliciting such a response, and that no
learning of the association between a CS and US will occur
in the absence of an orienting reflex to that CS. If that is
correct, Pavlov’s explanation of overshadowing appeals to
the idea that stimuli compete for attention and that attention
is necessary for learning. But this is quite different from the
attentional explanations proposed by Mackintosh (1975) or
Pearce and Hall (1980), where the emphasis is on changes
in attention as a consequence of learning. In different ways,
both of these last two accounts assume that the presence of
the more salient component of the compound CS results in
a more rapid decline in the attention paid to the less salient
component (and thus what is learned about it) than would
have occurred if it had been conditioned on its own.
There is no mention of changes in attention, of learning
to attend to, or ignore, stimuli in the account I have attributed
to Pavlov: the orienting or investigatory reflex is an inborn
reflex elicited by strong, novel stimuli. However, if it is only
novel stimuli that elicit the orienting reflex, then it must be
affected by experience, since repeated presentation of the
same stimulus will result in its habituation. We might, then,
be able to credit Pavlov with an explanation for a finding of
which he was wholly ignorant of, but which has seemed to
many to be the prime example of changes in attention or
associability—the phenomenon of latent inhibition (Lubow,
1973). Novel stimuli condition rapidly, but repeated
unreinforced presentation of a stimulus before the start of
conditioning trials results in relatively slow conditioning to
that stimulus. Whether or not latent inhibition can be attributed
to the habituation of an orienting reflex, what is lacking in
the account I am attributing to Pavlov is any detailed account
of the mechanism underlying such habituation. There is still
no consensus, but no shortage today of theories designed to
account for the decline in associability of a repeatedly
presented stimulus that is observed in experiments on latent
inhibition (e.g., McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000; Pearce & Hall,
1980; Wagner, 1981). What I want to go on to argue, however,
is that the phenomenon of latent inhibition does not exhaust
the reasons for needing to talk about changes in attention or
variable associability. A second of Pavlov’s discoveries,
referred to above, provides evidence of a second, quite
different mechanism—changes in attention to relevant and
irrelevant stimuli driven by differential reinforcement.
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Pavlov (1927, p.122) reported that, even after prolonged
training, a dog failed to learn a discrimination between a
circle and a nearly circular ellipse (with an 8:9 ratio of short
to long axes). When the dog was then trained with the circle
and more elliptical ellipses, however, before being tested
again on the previously insoluble discrimination, on this
final test he now performed perfectly accurately. Purists will
again have no difficulty in questioning this experimental
design: as in the case of the overshadowing experiment, the
problem is that the proper control requires a between-subject
design, and Pavlov’s experiments were always on single
animals. Nevertheless, here as elsewhere, Pavlov’s findings
are readily reproducible. Beginning with Lawrence (1952),
numerous experiments have established that animals trained
on an easy discrimination (e.g., black vs. white, green vs.
yellow) and then shifted to a hard version of this
discrimination (e.g., dark gray vs. light gray, green-yellow
vs. yellow-green) will perform substantially more accurately
on the hard discrimination than animals trained on the hard
discrimination from the outset (e.g., Haberlandt, 1971;
Logan, 1966; Mackintosh & Little, 1970). Like most
interesting psychological phenomena, transfer along a
continuum admits of several different explanations, although
I can find none in Pavlov’s own writings. Lawrence (1952)
himself argued that training on an easy black-white
discrimination made it easier for animals to learn to attend
to the relevant stimuli or stimulus dimension than did
training on a hard discrimination, where many more errors
will be made. Any theory that says that changes in attention
are driven by differential reinforcement will have no
difficulty in predicting this outcome. The best evidence for
this account is provided by Mackintosh and Little (1970),
who found that pigeons trained on an easy wavelength
discrimination performed more accurately on a hard
wavelength discrimination than those trained on the hard
discrimination from the outset—even if the easy discrimination
was initially trained with reversed reinforcement assignments.
That is to say: birds initially trained with yellow reinforced
and green unreinforced rapidly came to perform more
accurately when shifted to the hard discrimination with
green-yellow reinforced and yellow-green unreinforced than
birds trained on this hard discrimination from the outset. It
is difficult to see how this can be explained except by saying
that such easy training strengthened attention to the relevant
wavelength stimuli.
My argument, therefore, is that latent inhibition and
transfer along a continuum are evidence for quite different
mechanisms of changes in attention, one driven by simple
exposure to a stimulus, the other by differential reinforcement.
An experiment on flavor aversion learning by Scahill and
Mackintosh (2003) supports this argument. The design is
shown in Table 1. In stage 2, all animals are trained on a
difficult discrimination between two compound flavors, labeled
AX and BX, where the size of the letters indicates the salience
of the component flavors. The discrimination is hard because
the flavor common to the two compounds, X, is salient, while
the unique flavors, A and B, which differentiate the two
compounds, are less salient. It follows that there are two ways
of making the discrimination easier—either by increasing the
salience of the two unique flavors, so the discrimination is
between AX and BX, or by decreasing the salience of the
common flavor, here by eliminating it altogether, so the
discrimination is between A and B alone. Rats did indeed
find these two discriminations substantially easier than the
hard discrimination, and when shifted to the hard
discrimination in stage 2, performed significantly more
accurately than rats trained on the hard discrimination from
the outset. Transfer along a continuum was observed. 
The reason for using a flavor aversion paradigm was that
it is well established that simple unreinforced exposure to
two compound flavors, AX and BX, significantly facilitates
the subsequent learning of a discrimination between them,
and that one reason for this so-called perceptual learning
effect is that such exposure results in more latent inhibition
of the common X element, which is present on every exposure
trial, than of the unique A and B elements, each of which is
present on only half the exposure trials (see McLaren &
Mackintosh, 2000, for a review of this evidence). We might
expect, therefore, that stage 2 learning of the AX – BX
discrimination in this experiment would also be facilitated if,
in stage 1, animals simply received unreinforced exposure to
the various flavors. The critical question was whether we
would see an “exposure along a continuum” effect analogous
to transfer along a continuum, that is to say, whether
unreinforced exposure to the stimuli of the easy
discriminations, AX and BX, or A and B alone, would facilitate
subsequent learning of the hard AX - BX discrimination more
than exposure to AX and BX themselves. It did not.
Unreinforced exposure to AX and BX, or to AX and BX, did
indeed facilitate stage 2 discrimination learning—but it did
Table 1
Design of an Experiment on Transfer along a Continuum in Flavor Aversion Conditioning
Groups Stage 1 Stage 2 
Easy (1) AX vs. BX
Easy (2) A vs. B AX vs. BX
Hard AX vs. BX
Note. A, B and X are flavors, saline, sucrose and lemon, respectively, whose salience or concentration is represented by the size of the letter.
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so equally in both groups, while unreinforced exposure to A
and B alone was significantly less effective—indeed did not
have any effect on subsequent discrimination learning. What
we found, therefore, was a clear dissociation between the
effects of differentially reinforced discrimination training in
stage 1, and mere unreinforced exposure. The former effect
is readily explained by saying that easy discrimination training
made it easier for animals to learn to attend to the relevant
features of the compound flavors; the latter by saying that
unreinforced exposure facilitated subsequent discrimination
learning to the extent that it resulted in latent inhibition of
the common X flavor. Exposure to AX and BX, or to AX and
BX would result in the same level of latent inhibition to X;
exposure to A and B alone failed to facilitate subsequent
discrimination learning because it involved no exposure to X
at all. The dissociation therefore implies that we need to
distinguish two quite different processes, neither of which
was anticipated by Pavlov, underlying changes in attention
or variable associability. The study of simple Pavlovian
conditioning has not stood still.
Associative Learning in Humans
Pavlov undoubtedly believed that the study of
conditioned reflexes would advance our understanding of
human behavior. But when he applied his ideas to the human
condition, his application was often frankly crude: witness
his lectures on “The reflex of purpose” and “The reflex of
freedom” (Pavlov, 1928). The reflex of purpose is
characterized as “the fundamental form of the life energy
of us all,” while its absence, or more properly its inhibition,
is characteristic of the suicide (p. 279). Contemporary
associative learning theory is rather more sophisticated in
the ways in which it seeks to apply associative principles,
as revealed in experiments on Pavlovian conditioning in
animals, to human behavior. Note that I did not say the
study of Pavlovian conditioning in humans, for it is, I think,
an open question how far GSR or eyelid conditioning in
people is mediated by simple associative processes, and how
far more complex cognitive operations take over control of
people’s behavior in such experiments. The same could be
said about experiments on causal or contingency judgments.
Shanks and Dickinson (1988) pioneered studies that show
important parallels between the behavior of people in such
experiments and of animals in Pavlovian conditioning
experiments, but cognitive theories of contingency judgments
still flourish (e.g., Cheng, 1997). 
It is not an easy matter to decide between associative
and cognitive accounts of human behavior. One strategy
that we have pursued is as follows. We start with an
experimental paradigm where the behavior of people
normally differs in an important respect from that of, say,
pigeons, and where it is plausible to attribute that difference
to the operation, in people, of some cognitive process absent
in pigeons. We then change the experimental procedure in
a way calculated to make it harder for people to use that
cognitive operation. If the effect of this manipulation is to
eliminate the difference in the behavior of people and
pigeons, we conclude that their now similar behavior can
be explained by application of the same simple associative
theory. I illustrate this strategy with some experiments on
relational learning and the peak shift.
Pigeons are adept at learning, and remembering, large
numbers of visual discrimination problems. But although
there have been heroic efforts to prove that they are capable
of learning generalized matching or same-different
discriminations (e.g., Cook, Cavoto, & Cavoto, 1995; Wright,
Cook, Rivera, Sands, & Delius, 1988), the most striking
impression one receives from these studies is how
astonishingly difficult pigeons find it to learn about the
relationship between two or more stimuli (Mackintosh, 2000).
They do not even show convincing evidence of learning
about such physical relationships as “taller than” or “brighter
than,” when trained on a simple height or brightness
discrimination (Pearce, 1991; Wills & Mackintosh, 1999).
What they will show, following such training, is a peak shift
—a phenomenon first discovered by Hanson (1959), but
which is illustrated here in Figure 1. Hanson trained pigeons
on a wavelength discrimination, with light of 550 nm as S+
and light of 560 nm as S–. When tested in extinction with
wavelengths ranging from 480 to 620 nm, their peak rate of
responding was not to S+, but to stimuli close to S+, but
away from S–, here 540 and 530 nm. Although such behavior
may look like relational transposition (they were trained
to respond to the shorter of two wavelengths, and on 
Figure 1. A schematic illustration of the peak shift—not real data,
but entirely typical of the results of numerous experiments
following Hanson’s (1959) original demonstration. Subjects respond
more to S+ than to S–, but even more to a novel test stimulus
close to S+ on the opposite side from S–. When they are tested
with stimuli far from S+, and with the furthest away stimulus,















Ilustration of Peak Shift
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tests responded even more to even shorter wavelengths than
to their S+), we know that it is more economically and
accurately explained by appeal to interacting gradients of
excitation and inhibition conditioned to S+ and S–. This
was first shown by Spence (1937), but Table 2 provides an
elemental illustration of the argument. Stimuli are
conceptualized as sets of elements, with each element of
S+ and S– entering into association with the outcome of
each training trial. The net associative value of S+, S–, and
three test stimuli (close to, far from, and furthest from, S+)
is also shown, and as can be seen, although S+ has greater
value than S–, so the discrimination is learned, it has less
than the close stimulus, so a peak shift is shown. The best
evidence for this analysis is the observation that the pigeons’
responding declines sharply when they are tested with even
shorter wavelengths, i.e., stimuli far from S+ (in Hanson’s
experiment, 520 and 510 nm). As can be seen in Table 2,
this is exactly the result predicted by Spence’s analysis, or
its elemental version.
It is not, however, how people behave. Wills and
Mackintosh (1998) trained both people and pigeons on
comparable brightness discriminations, and tested them with
stimuli even brighter, or darker than, the stimuli on which
they were trained. Pigeons showed a standard peak shift:
they responded more to a test stimulus close to S+ than to
S+ itself, but responding fell off when they were tested with
a stimulus even further removed from S+. People, on the
other hand, showed no such decline in performance to “far”
stimuli: the brighter (or darker) the test stimulus, the more
accurately they responded. The implication, confirmed by
interviewing participants after the experiment, is that they
had solved their initial discrimination relationally—that is
to say, they had learned to make one response to bright, or
brighter, stimuli, and another to dark, or darker, ones. Aitken
(1966; see Mackintosh, 1997) has shown a similar pattern
of results when pigeons and people are trained on a
categorization problem—to make one response to short and
fat wedge-shaped stimuli, and another to long and thin
wedges. Here too, pigeons showed a peak shift: they
responded more accurately to stimuli somewhat shorter and
fatter, or longer and thinner, than the stimuli on which they
had been trained; but as the stimuli moved even further
away from the training set, so the accuracy of their
performance declined. People, however, responded more
accurately and more rapidly, the longer and thinner, or
shorter and fatter, the test stimulus was.
A plausible assumption is that such relational responding
depends on people’s ability to label the stimuli on which
they are trained, as bright or dark, or short and fat or long
and thin. One way to prevent such relational learning, then,
would be to use stimuli, and a stimulus dimension, to which
no labels could be attached. In an attempt to achieve this,
Wills and Mackintosh (1998) constructed stimuli from a set
of wholly arbitrary elements or “icons,” in a manner similar
to the stimuli illustrated in Table 2. The stimulus dimension
was constructed, as in Table 2, by removing some elements
or icons from each stimulus, and adding new ones, as one
moved along the dimension. That this did generate a
dimension is shown by the fact that, having learned to
discriminate between two neighboring stimuli, pigeons
showed a standard peak shift when tested with stimuli close
to, and further away from, their initial S+ and S–. That
people were unable to label these stimuli is shown by the
fact that they too now showed a peak shift, responding more
accurately to stimuli close to their S+ and S–, but less
accurately to “far” stimuli. 
In a similar manner, Aitken (1996) was also able to show
a true peak shift in people trained on the short-fat, long-thin
categorization task, by turning it into something like an
implicit learning problem. Participants were required to
respond as rapidly and accurately as possible to a target
stimulus that appeared on the left or right of a computer
screen. On some trials, the location of the target was in fact
predicted by the shape of the wedge that appeared on the
screen, along with a lot of other irrelevant stimuli, at the
beginning of the trial (on most trials, no wedge appeared,
and there was no way of predicting on which side the target
would appear). Although very few participants explicitly
realized this, they must all have learned it, since they all
had faster reaction times on trials when the predictive wedge
Table 2
Schematic Illustration of an Elemental Analysis of the Peak Shift
Stimuli
1 (furthest)   2 (far)       3 (close) 4 (S+) 5 (S–)   
Elements      0112 1223 2334 3445 4556
+ + +++ ++++ +++
– – – – – – – – –
Net +/–          0 + 1 + 2 + 1 – 1
Note. Stimuli are conceptualized as sets of elements, here labeled 1 to 6, with each stimulus having a “central” element plus two flanking
elements. Each element of S+ and S– enters into association with the outcome of each training trial, so elements common to S+ and S–
are associated with both + and – outcomes. The net associative value of each stimulus on the dimension is given by the difference
between + and – for each element.
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appeared than on trials when it did not. When now tested
with even shorter and fatter or longer and thinner wedges,
they showed a standard peak shift, responding faster and
more accurately to “close” test stimuli, but slower and less
accurately to “far” stimuli. Interestingly enough, the two or
three participants who did realize that there was a
relationship between the shape of the wedge and the side
on which the target stimulus appeared did not show a peak
shift: they responded even more accurately to “far” stimuli.
Our interpretation of these results is that, by embedding the
predictive relationship between wedge and target in a lot of
irrelevant information, and requiring participants to respond
as rapidly as possible, we made it very difficult for them to
articulate this relationship. Nevertheless, their associative
system detected, and learned about, the contingency between
wedge and target. Associative learning is all about detecting
contingencies.
Conclusion
These last two experiments show that there are
circumstances where people will solve discrimination or
categorization problems in much the same way as pigeons,
and in a manner entirely consistent with an associative
analysis. That there are circumstances where they do not –
because, for example, they detect relationships between
stimuli—is not very surprising. The importance of these
results, I venture to suggest, is that they reveal the operation
of a simple associative learning system in people, when
steps are taken to make it harder for them to deploy the
cognitive resources normally available to them.
This associative learning system, as Pavlov certainly
believed, is indeed of widespread importance—common to
most if not all vertebrates, and also to some invertebrates. It
will solve a wide variety of problems, many superficially quite
complex, and it is what enables other animals, and ourselves,
to gain an understanding of the causal structure of the world.
Pavlov’s great insight was to see that it could be successfully
studied in a very simple preparation, and that the development
and exploitation of the paradigm he devised was the critical
step needed to generate a coherent body of knowledge about
associative learning, which in turn was the critical step needed
to develop an adequate theory of associative learning. If today
we have made some progress towards this latter goal, that is
thanks to Pavlov’s pioneering work.
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